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Insanity as a Defenge in Criminal Law.
The great advancement which has been made by theo
scientists of our da7 in the study and treatment of
insanity; the alarming increase in prevalence of the
malady; and especially the large number of important
criminal prosecutions in which the pla of insanity is
entered,unite to make our subject one which is not only
of considerable moment but of vital and absorbing inter-
est. Speaking generally, it may be said that insanity
in some form has always been regarded by law as an ex-
cuse for the commission of crime. Perhaps the earliest
common law case on the subject is that recorded in the
Year Book of 21st. year of Henry VII (1) where it is
simply said that "A man was arraigned for the murder of
a child, and it was found that at the time of the mur-
der the felon was not of sane memory, by which it was
determined that he should go free, quod nota bene".
But the difficult problem has been, to establish a test
by which we may determine what constitutes such insanity
as will, by law, exempt a criminal from punishment.
(2) To determine upon the amount of evidence necessary
to establish such insanity.
(1) Y. B. 21 11. VII 31 b.
I. What is the legal test of insanity?
Upon the very threshold of the study of this
vexed question, it must be remembered that accurately
speaking, the insanity of a person is never at issue in
criniinal cases, but only his Punishabilit. As has
been said by another (D. B. Ogden in 11Am. L. Rev. 66)
"A nTwn maybe admittedly as mad as King Lear, and yet be,
in the eyes of the law, as amenable to punishment for
crimes not resulting from such madness as the most
clear-headed citizen of the land.
The earliest attempt to lay down a test for crim-
inal responsibility was made by Lord Hale (1 11. p. C.
290). "There is a partial insanity", he said, "and a
total insanity, xxx and the partial insanity seems not
to excuse them in the comnmitting of any offence in mat-
ters capital, for doubtless most persons that are felons
of themselves, and others, are under a degree of partial
insanity when they commit those offences xxxx. Such
a person as laboring under melancholy distemper, hath
yet ordinarily as great understanding as a child of four-
teen years h~th, is such a person as may be guilty of a
felony or treason".
This test is doubtless a very vague one but it
has nevertheless exerted a considerable influence over
the subsequent development of the law. At any rate it
affords a convenient starting point from which to trace
the variations of the law in the later cases.
In the case of Edward Arnold (16 !low. St. Trials
695) who was indicted in 1724 for an attempt to murder
Lord Onslow, the plea of insanity was entered as a de-
fense and the rules laid down by Lord Hale w.,ere pract-
ically followed. The prisoner was undoubtedly insane.
His habits were idle, irregular, and disordered.
Disregarding the entreaties of his friends, he lived
alone in a desolate, unfurnished house and had been in
the habit of lying about in barns and under hay ricks.
Ile was accustomed to curse and swear to himself for
hours at a time, would laugh wildly without any apparent
cause, and his sleep was troubled by fancied n6isess
and apparitions. Among his other dolusions he believed
that Lord Onslow was the cause of all the tumults and
trouble that happened to the country and seemed to fancy
that he was the special object of his malevolence, de-
claring frequently that he sent his imps and devils
into the room at night. And yet in spite of this
evidence he was found guilty, Mr. Justice Tracy instruct-
ing the jury that "It is not every kind of frantic humor
or something unaccountable in a man's action that points
him out to be such a mad man an is exempted from punish-
ment; it must be a man that is totally deprived of his
understanding and memory, and doth not know what he is
doing, no more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild
beatt; such a one is never the subject of punishment".
The theory which has been called by 14andsley the
"wild beast" theory seems to have been followed for
many years although the cases of Lord Ferrer decided in
1760 (19 How. St. Trials 866) and James Hatfield decided
in 1800 (27 How. St. Trials i82) indicate a tendency
toward a more humane test. In the latter case, the
great Lord Erskinein arguing against the "wild beast"
theory said that "No such madness ever existed in the
world, that in all the cases the insane persons had not
only had the most perfect knowledge and recollection of
all the relations they stood in toward others, and of
the acts and circumstances of their lives but had in
general been remarkable for subtilty and accuteness and
that delusion, of which the criminal act in question
was the immediate, unqualified offspring, was the kind
of insanity which should rightly exempt from punishment.
Delusion where there is no frenzy or raving madness, is
the true characteriof'insanity". The trial of this
case attracted a good deal of attention and seems to
have had a modifying influence upon the Judicial minds.
Accordingly, twelve years later, in the case of
Billingham (5 C. 8 P. 108 Note (a)) we find Lord
Mansfield declaring that the true test for determining
the prisoner's responsibility in the capability of dis-
tinguishing between right and wrong. "It must be
all
proved beyond doubt," he says, "that at the time he
committed the atrocious act he did not consider that
murder was a crime against the laws of God and Nature."
These two cases were followed for several years,
although the law on the subject continued to be in an
unsettled and vacillating condition until the decision
in the famous T.c Naghton Case in 1843 (10 C. p F. 200).
Mc Naghton murdered one Druimond, under the delusion
that he was one of a band of conspirators whom he be-
lieved to be following him, blasting his character and
making his life miserable. There was very strong exp@rt
tds.timony'going to show that the knowledge of right and
wrong was not the true test of responsibility and des-
pite the fact that he was able to transact business and
evinced no symptOms of mental disorder in his conduct;
he was acquitted on the ground of insanity. The ver-
dict filled all England with indigrtion and alarm,
and raised a perfect storm of protest. ft was finally
made a subject of debate in the House of Lords, and it
was there determined to state the opinion of the judges
on the law governing such cases. Four questions were
propounded, onlN. two of which, however, are of great im-
portance, namely the second and third. These are as
foll ows:
"2nd. What are the proper questions to be submit-
ted to the jury, when a person alleged to be afflicted
with insane delusion respecting one or more particular
subjects or persons is charged with the cotmmistion of a
crime (murder, for example), and insanity is set up
as a defense?"
"3rd. In what terms ought the question to be left
to the jury as to the prisoner's state of mind when the
act wus committed?"
In answering these questions, hr. Justice Mlaule
spoke for himself, but the court, through Lord Chief
Justice Tindal, said, "And as these two questions appear
to us to be more conveniently answered together, we
have to submit our opinion to be, tiat the jurors ought
to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed
to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason
to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be
proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish
a defense on the ground of insanity, it inust be clearly
proved that at the time of t'- e conmnitting; of the act,
the party accused aas laboring under such a defect of
reason, from desease of the inind as not to knowr the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or if he
did know it, he did not know that it .ras Yrong."
We have dwelt upon this case at, some length, be-
vause of its great influence upon the existing law.
The so-called "Knowledge of right and wrong" test laid
down by Tindal C. J. as above, has remained in England
practically unchanged, and is followed as well in most
of ou r American courts.
As early as 1851, only eight years after the de-
cision in Mc Naghtons case, Mr. Justice Curtis of the
United States Circuit Court in Unit-ed States v lic Glue,
1 Curtis C. C. 1, declared the test to be "the capacity
to distinguish between right and wrong, as to the par-
ticular act with which the accused is charged. If he
understands the nature of his act; if he knoxs '-is act
to be criminal, and that if he does it he will do wrong
and deserve piunishvnent; then, in the judgement of the
law, he has a criminal intent and is not insane so as
to be exempt from responsibility. On the other hand
if he is under such delusion as not to understand the
nature of his act, or if he has not sufficient memory
and reason and judgement to know that he is doing wrong
or not sufficient conscience to discern that his act is
criminal and deserving punishment, he is not respon-
sible." This rule has been adopted in at least sixteen
of. the states, viz: California, New Jersey, 'Jisconsin,
M1issouri, Tennessee, Texas, Alabama, Virginia, Lousiana,
North Carolina, Maine, Georgia, Mlississippi, Delaware,
and Nebraska (1). In the New York case of Flannigan
vs People, 52 N. Y. 467, a strong effort was made to
change the test, but it was unsuccessful, the court de-
claring the rule as laid down in Mc Naghtons case to be
the settled law of the state. And it may be added
that in the present Penal Code of this state the rule
remains unchanged. In a few states however the test
has been considerable altered. Thus, Judge Dillon of
Iowa in the case of Tetter vs State 25 Iowva 63 said"if by
the observation and concurrent testimony of medical
men who make the study of insanity a speciality, it
should be definitely established to be true that there
is an unsound condition of the mind, that is a deseased
condition of the mind in which though a person knows
(1) See Art. by lill in 15 Am. Law fev.
that a given act is wrong, he is yet by an insane im-
pulse, that is an impulse proceeding from disease of the
mind, irresistably driven to commit a crime, the law
must modify its ancient doctrine and recognize the truth
and give to this condition, when it is satisfactorily
shown to exist, its exculpation." This is an admirable
statement of the so-called doctrine of uncontrollable
impulse and it seems to us to be the doctrine which
should have been adopted in all American Courts. It
has been adopted in Pennsylvania, Ohio, 11innesota,
Kentucky, and perhaps a few other states. In Massachu-
setts the matter does not seem to be entirely clear for
although in the leading case of Commonwealth vs Rogers,
7 Ifetclaf 500, Chief Justice Shaw distinctly says that
a person acting in an "irresistable and uncontrollable
impulse" is not punishable for crime, a careful reading
of his opinion leaves one in considerable doubt as to
whether he really intended to recognize this doctrine.
The question as to whether or not an "uncontrollable
impulse" should be recognized by la'r as an excuse for
the commission of crime, has provoked endless discussion
and controversy, not only in the courts, but among
scientists and philanthropists. And it is at present
difficult to predict to what extent the more liberal
doctrine may in the future be adopted. Both sides
have already received the support of many strong
authorities. Gibbon, C. J. in charging the jury in
Commonwealth vs flosler, 4 Pa. St. 267, said "But there
is a moral or homicidal insanity, consisting of an
irresistable inclination to kill or to commit some other
particular offense. There may be an unseen ligament
pressing on the mind, drawing it to the consequences
which it sees, but cannot avoid, and placing it under
a coercion, which, while its results are clearly per-
ceived, is incapable of resistance." In Parsons vs
State, 81 Ala. 577, the court acknowledged that the
"right and wrong" test had been adopted by the state
but reopened the question and after thorough considera-
tion held that "uncontrolIab2re impulse" should be a
defense, Somerville, J. declaring that the law had not
kept pace with the progress of thought and discovery,
in the present advanced stages of medical science.
It cannot be denied that the above decisions are
in accord with modern scientific theories of insanity.
The capacity to distinguish between right and wrong,
whether abstractly or as applied to the particular act,
as a legal test of insanity and responsibility for
crime is repudiated by all modern authorities in medi-
cal jurisprudence. "With rega!'d to this test" says
Dr. Reynolds in his work on "The Scientific Value of the
Legal Tests of Insanity" on p. 54 "I may say, and most
emphatically, that it is utterly untrustworthy, because
untrue to the obvious facts of nature." Other great
specialists have expressed similar views. A striking
instance is found in the following Resolution unanimous-
ly passed at the Annual meeting of the British Associa-
tion of medical officers of Asylums and Hospitals for
the Insane held July 14, 1864:
"Resolved that so:-ruch of the legal test of
the mental condition of an alleged criminal lunatic as
renders him a responsible agent, because he knows the
difference between right, and wrong,, is inconsistent
with the fact,,well known to every member of this meet-
ing, .that the power of.distinguishing between right and
wrong exists very frequently in those who are undoubt-
edly insane, and is often associated with dangerous and
uncontrollable delusions." (1)
iHor are the modern law writers backward in express-
ing disapproval of the old "right and wrong" test.
(1) see Ordronaux's "Judicial Aspects of Insanity" pp.
423 - 4.
Sir Fitzjaners Stephen in Vol. II of his great History
of the Criminal Law of England at p. 108 says that
"it ought to be the law of England that no act is a
crime if the person 41ho does it is at the time when
it is done prevented either by defective mental power
from controling his own conduct, unless the absence of
the power of control has been produced by his own de-
fault." (I)
The theory of uncontrollable impulse has also been
accepted in the Codes of several European countries.
The Criminal Code of Germany contains the following
provision, which is said to have been the formulated
result of a very able discussion both by the physicians
and lawyers of that country: "There is no criminal act
when the actor at the time of the offense is in a state
of unconsciousness or morbid disturbance of the mind,
through which the free determination of his will is
excluded." (2) It is provided in the code of France
that "There can be no crime or offence if the accused
was in a state of madness at the time of the act."
(1) See I Bisb. Cv. L. (7th. Ed.1) Sec. 386 et seq. and
1 Whart Cr. Law (9th.Ed.) Sec. 45.
(2) Encyc. Brit. (9th. Ed.) Vol. 9 p. 112 citing
German Cr. Code (Sec. 51 R. G. B.)
At first the French courts were inclined to interpret
this law in such a manner as to follow in substance
the law of England. But it is now construed in accord-
ance with the modern scientific view.
In spite of this great mass of testimony against
the old test, however, the m ajority of our courts as has
been seen still cling to it, and firmly refuse to
adopt the theory of"uncontrollable impulse." In State
vs Pagels, 92 Mo. 300, the court said: "It will be a
bad day for this state when uncontrollable impulse
shall dictate a rule of action to our courts." In
State vs Mo'rey, 37 Kan. 369, the jury was directed that
"The law recognizes no form of insanity, although the
mental faculties may be destroyed or deranged, so long
as the person committing the crime knew what he was
doing and that the act was wrong." The California
Supreme Court, in People vs loin, 62 Cal. 120, held
that an irresistible impulse to commit a criminal act
"does not absolve the actor, if at the time and in
respect to the act he had the power to distinguish be-
tween right and wrong." Another very interesting case
is the recent one of State v. Harrison, 36 YT. Va. 729
decided in 1892. The court reviews with great thor-
oughness the cases on both sides of the question and
concludes that the old test of "rigjht and w ong" is
best suited to the practical administration of justice, -
and as the safest rule for 9l.e protection of human life.
"This 'irresistible impulse' test has been only
recently presented" said Brannor, J., "and while it is
supported by plausible arguments, yet it is rather refined
and introduces what seems to me a useless element of
distinction for a test, and is misleading to juries,
and fraught with danger to human life, so much so that
even its advocates have warningly said it should be
very cautiously applied, and only in the clearest cases.
It will thus be seen that the opposition to this
new test does not arise from ignorance on the part of
our courts or from their inhumanity; but because
they fear that its introduction would be' dangerous, and
,nght tend to defeat the protection which the law af-
fords against the acts of criminals. As Andrews, J.
said in the New York case of Flanagan vs People (Supra)
"Whatever medical or scientific authority there may be
for this view, it has not been accepted by courts of
law. The vagueness and uncertainity of the inquiry
which would be opened and the manifest danger of intro-
ducing the limitation claimed into the rule of respon-
sibility, in cases of crime, may well cause courts to
pause before assenting to it. Indulgence in evil pas-
sions weaken the restraining power of the will and con-
science; and the rule suggested would be the cover for
the conission of crime and its justification. 1o
doubt but that there is great force in this argument
and it may be that the courts will cling to it for a
long time. But as the theory which considers every
criminal tendency as a disease seems to grow in favor
among our scientists and is indeed rapidly gaining a
foothold in the popular mind, it may be expected that
the rule of punishability of insane criminals Trill grad-
ually soften and in time willAthe point where the true
test will be - was the commission of the crime the re-
sult, in any way, of the pr-Isoner's insane delusion ?
There is no doubt in our own minds but that this is the
true test and it ought to be applied in our courts of
justice.
Ii. hat is the rule of evidence as to the proof
of insanity ?
The consideration of ti'is part of our subject
involves almost as much difficulty A-s that of the first
one. Of course the courts are more certain of their
ground and are not deceived and confused b:y any scien-
tific theories, but nevertheless their disarreement
is just as marked. And it may be premised that to ask
a jury comprised of men of only ordinary intelligence
and education, to detertmine whethqr or not certain
proved facts constitute insanity, seems rather strange.
Such a duty, it would seem could only be properly per-
formed by experts in mental diseases. But such is
universally the lar and moreover, it seeis on the whole
to work satisfactorily.
In their answer to the questions of the House of
Lords, the judges in 111c Naghton's case said that in
every case the jury should be told that every man is
to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient
degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes until
the contrary be proved to their satisfaction. This
general rule is conceded by all courts but the diffi-
culty is to determine where lies the burden of proof.
This question does not seem to have been mush discussed
in the earlier cases. Lord Erskine, one of the
counsel in Hatfield's case (Supra) said in the course
of his opening address to the jury: "The ,thole proof,
therefore, is undoubtedly cast on me." Singularly
enough, howevei he voluntarily assumed a position more
difficult than the court desired to impose upon him for
Lord Kenyon said: "His sanity must be made o% to the
satisfaction of a moral !,inn, xxxx ,7,ct if the scales
hang any thing like even,throwin" in a certain pro-
portion of mercy to the party." .ut history has
justified Lord Erskine, for it cannot be denied his
rule and not that stated by Lord Kenyon, is the law
in England today.
The cases on this question both in England and
America are almost numberless and it would profit little
to discuss them at any great length. The different
rules of evidence which they support are these:
1. Insanity must be proved by a preponderance of
evidence.
2. Insanity must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
3. If any evidence of insanity is introduced,
the burden is on the plaintiff to show sanity by a pre-
ponderance of evidence.
The first of these rules depends upon the premise
that insanity is a simple question of fact to be proved
like any other fact and any evidence which reasonably
satisfies the jury that the accused was insane at the
time of committing the act, should be sufficient for
an acquittal. This view is taken by the United States
courts and by the courts of at least fourteen states
viz: Massachusetts, Maine, Virginia, California,
Louisiana, Mlinnesota, Georgia, Iississippi, Alabama,
Ohio, Mlissouri, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Texas(l).
In some of these states however, the degree of proof
remains an unsettled question.
The second of these rules throws the burden of
proof upon the accused and in order to establish his
insanity and thus secure his acquittal it rests upon
the defendant to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable
doubt. The theory of this rule wag that in asmuch as
the presumption of innocence attends the defendant on
trial and the state must prove his guilt beyond all
reasonable doubt and inasmuch as the general rule above
stated as to the presumption of sanity attends the case
of the state, the same amount of evidence should be
brought before the jury to remove the presumption in
one case as in the other. And as thfe state must es-
tablish the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable
doubt so the defendant must establish his insanity be-
yond a reasonable doubt if he take advantage of tIhat
plea. As was said b,, Chief Lust ice 'Hornblower in
State v Spenser, I Abv. 196, "The proof of insanity at
the time of comitting the act ought to be as clear
(1) See Art. of E. B. Hill in 15 Am. L. Rev. at . 727.
-nd satisfactory, in order to acquit him on +te ground
of insanity, as the proof of corn:qitting the act ouiht
to *be in order to find a man guilty." This rule is
in reality very weak and entirely without foundation.
The effect of the presumption in favor of the innocence
of the defendant is to protect innocent persons from
punishment. If this be the object of the law it cer-
tainly would not impose an equally heavy burden upon a
person who is trying to prove that by reason of insanity
he was morally innocent of the crime. The only state
which has adopted this rule is New Jersey(!). Delaware
at one time was inclined to adopt it but it hs since
refused to do so and now follows the first rule stated
above. It seems also that the state of Oregon has by
statute adopted this rule.
The third rule is the one that is most favorable
to the accused and it rests upon the theory that a man
is presumed sane but when the question of his insanity
is raised and evidence is introduced to show that he
vras insane there rests with the nrosecution to sho.r that
the man was sane as a part of their case. In fact it
becomes a part of their case and. the state must prove
(1) State v Spenser I AabO. 196.
it beyond all reasonable doubt like other facts of the
case. This rule has been accepted in how PTar-pnhire,
Nebraska, Tennesee, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, 71entucl!y,
2ichigan, New York, and iorth Carolina (1).
It would thus appear that as between the first and
third rules the states are very evenly divided. Per-
haps a slight weight of authority favors t~he theory
that a defendant alleging insanity must prove it by a
preponderance of evidence. The third rule which pro-
vides that whenever the jury has reasonable doubt of
sanity they should acquit the prisoner would seem to be
more in accord with the general principles of criminal
law. It is universally acknowledged that the true
rule is that where the jury has a reasonable doubt as
to a mans guilt it is their duty to acquit. But if
the person is insane he morally is not guilty and there-
fore it clearly follows that a reasonable doubt of his
sanity is in reality a reasonable doubt of his guilt
and should result in his acquittal.
This is the reasoning which has been followed in
our own state of iew York. it was said as early f
(1) See Art. by Hill (Supra).
1857 in the lep~ain! case of "c Cann v People, i, I!. Y.
57, that "If there should be a doubt about the killing,
all *rill concede that the prisoner is entitled to the
benefit of it; and if there is an:y doubt about will,
the faculty of the prisoner to discern between richt and
wrong, why should be be deprived of the benefit of it,
when both this act and the will are necessary to make
out the crime." This is a most convincing argument
and although for sorie time the New YorkiCourts wavered,
they finally settled upon the rule under discussion.
And it should be noted that the New York Courts are so
liberal as to require only that the jury be plainly
instructed that a reasonable doubt in their minds upon
the question of insasnity entitles the prisoner to an
acquittal. Nice distinctions in regard to the burden
of proof may be made, but are entirely unnec ssary.
Although, as we have seen, this rule appeals very
strongly to our reason and sense of justice, it must
be admitted that in the light of general principles of
evidence and pleading it does not appear tc be logical.
The plea of insanity is not a traverse but a ples. of
confession; and avoidance. One w-eho pleads insanity
to an indictment admits facts from wrhich malice is al-
ways, if there is nothing more, conclusively presumed,
but avoids the presumption by the fact of insanity,
and so denies the malice. Ac Danforth J. puts it in
State v Lawrence 57 'e. at 583, the plea of insanity
"does not deny a sin9le allegation in ti indictment,
but simply says, -rant all these allegations to bo true,
and still guilt does not follow, because the doer of
them is not responsible therefor. It does not meet
an,, question propounded br the indictment, but raises
one outside of it. It is not a mere denial but a
positive allcration, xxxxx. When insanity is found,
it does not show that the act was any the lees wilful,
or deliberate, or even intentional; but it does show
an excuse, an irresponsibilit'y for what 'roull have other-
wise been criminal. It would seem then, that the
question of insanity can never be raised, unless by the
prisoner; and by him only in an affirmative allegation,
such as carries .,rith it thie burden of proof." It is
i!npossible to foretell which of theee two radically
conflicting rules will survive the test of time.
Indeed it is probable that both will find suiport until
the rising tide of popular and scientific opinion :,rears
away entirely the present theory of insanity as a
defense to crime, and lifts the unfortunate insane
criminal to a position where he will be safe from
23
the ignorance and prejudice ,hy vih ich ne is continually
menaced.

